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THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE NATIONAL 
MONUMENT: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RIGHTS IN THE NATION'S LANDS 
Colin Foley* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 1996, President Clinton, exercising his authority 
as Executive under the Antiquities Act of 1906,1 issued a Presidential 
Proclamation that created the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument (Escalante) on 1.7 million acres of federal land in southern 
Utah.2 The President's purpose was to preserve the land located 
within the monument for future generations.3 In signing the Procla-
mation, the President stated that the monument status accomplished 
this goal in two ways.4 First, it permanently withdrew the land from 
disposition under public land laws, preventing any future government 
grants of private rights in the land.5 Second, it halted the plans of 
Andalex Resources (Andalex), a Dutch mining company, to mine coal 
on seventeen leases6 it owns in a 650,000 acre portion of the monument 
known as the Kaiparowits Plateau.7 The Presidential Proclamation 
affords Andalex the opportunity to swap these leases for coal leases 
in other parts of Utah, and Clinton encouraged Andalex to do just 
* Business Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
1 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1996). 
2 See Presidential Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,225 (1996). 
a See Remarks by the President in Making Environment Announcement, M2 PRESSWIRE, 
Sept. 19, 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Remarks 
by the President]. 
4 See Presidential Proclamation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 50,225; Remarks by the President, supra note 
3, at 3. 
5 See Presidential Proclamation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 50,225. 
6 See BLM Serial Register Pages, available from BLM, Utah State Office. 
7 See Remarks by the President, supra note 3, at 3; Ed Jahn, Monumental Discontent? Many 
in Southern Utah Say Decision Threatens Their Future, SAN DIEGO UNION-'l'RIB., Oct. 14, 1996, 
743 
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that.s Currently Andalex and the Department of the Interior (DOl) 
are in discussions over the issue.9 
Apparently the President and the DOl determined that Andalex 
was entitled to the lease swaps as a form of compensation for a 
government taking of Andalex's rights under the Fifth Amendment.lO 
Given the current state of takings law, they were almost certainly 
correct.11 This Comment attempts to provide a basic understanding 
of public land law, and to show how it correctly balanced the compet-
ing public and private interests in Escalante. 
To properly understand the issues surrounding the creation of Es-
calante and Andalex's rights under its leases, a basic understanding 
of public land law as well as mining law is required.12 Section II 
provides a brief history of public land law. It focuses on congressional 
power to regulate the public lands, and the changes in public land law 
policy over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Section III provides a brief survey of the development of the law 
governing coal mining on public lands, and gives a detailed description 
at AI. The purpose of the Antiquities Act, as its name suggests, is to preserve objects of 
antiquity within the monument. See Remarks by the President, supra note 3, at 3. Such objects 
include paleontogical and archeological artifacts, and in the proclamation the President cited 
numerous examples of the existence of such objects within the monument. See id. Given this 
objective, it is highly unlikely that the construction of the roads necessary to facilitate the 
mining, and the mining itself, would comply with the preservationist goals of the Act. See Press 
Briefing by Secretary of Interior Babbit, Mike McCurry and Joe Lockhart, M2 PRESSWIRE, 
Sept. 20 1996, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Curnws File. 
S See Remarks by the President, supra note 3, at 3. 
9 See Jim Woolf, Andalex Gives up on Kaiparawits Mine; National Monuments Creation 
Poses Obstacles for Project, SALT LAKE 'IRIB., Jan. 24,1996, at BI. This, however, may not have 
stopped fossil fuel exploration in the Kaiparowits Plateau. See Brent Israelsen, Environmen-
talists Appeal BLM Ruling Allowing Conoco to Drill in Monument, SALT LAKE 'IRIB., Sept. 
13, 1997, at D2. Conoco, an oil company that owns 59 oil leases in the monument, has not agreed 
to enter negotiations for lease swaps. See id. In September of 1997, the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), the agency charged with the administration of the monument, approved 
Conoco's "request to drill a wildcat [oil] well in Reese Canyon on the Kaiparowits Plateau." See 
id. This drilling is for the limited purpose of determining if the wells hold commercial quantities 
of oil. See Talk of the Nation: Mining Monuments/Mining Asteroids (Comments of Don Banks, 
Chief of External Affairs, Utah State Bureau of Land Management) (NPR radio broadcast, 
Sept. 12, 1997). As of November 1997, the BLM had not made a determination of what it will 
do if Conoco actually finds "commercial quantities" of oil and wants to initiate full-scale drilling 
operations. See id. 
10 See Remarks by the President, supra note 3, at 3. 
11 See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Debenedic-
tis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
12 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND 
RESOURCE LAW 34 (1980). 
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of the changes in the federal coal mining leasing process. In addition 
to providing important background information on public land and 
federal coal mining law, Section II and Section III reveal how funda-
mental principles of public land law, guided by changes in societal 
values, have evolved over time. Section IV, through an exposition of 
the 1992 United States Supreme Court Case Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council,13 briefly discusses the status of current takings law, 
and makes an argument both for compensation for Andalex, and a 
proper regard for current societal and environmental interests. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW 
A. Introduction 
The history of the public lands and public land law in the United 
States is in many ways a history of the growth and development of 
the nation itself.14 Over the past two hundred years public land law 
has developed to meet the needs of an ever changing and growing 
nation.15 No one statutory scheme has governed this development, 
and as a result, public land law today is a hodgepodge of many differ-
ent statutes, regulations, and agency mandates with varying pur-
poses.16 
To make the study of this area of the law more complex, there are 
multiple meanings of the term "public land."17 The classic legal defini-
tion is "lands of the United States subject to disposition under the 
general land laws,"18 i.e., federally owned lands in which the govern-
ment grants rights or fee simple ownership to private individuals or 
states.19 The current technical legal definition is "lands and interests 
in lands the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages,"20 as well 
as lands and interests that the National Park Service, Forest Service, 
13 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
14 See Marla E. Mansfield, When "Public" Rights Meet "Private" Rights: The Problems of 
Labeling and Regulatory Takings, 65 COLO. L. REV. 193, 194 (1994); see generally PAUL 
WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968); COGGINS & WILKIN-
SON, supra note 12, at 34-143. 
15 See Mansfield, supra note 14, at 195-201; COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 14, at 34-143; 
see generally GATES, supra note 14. 
16 See, e.g., Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 802 
(1993); GATES, supra note 14; COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 34-143. 
17 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 802. 
18 [d. 
19 See id. at 821. 
20 [d. at 802. 
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and Fish and Wildlife Service manage.21 The change is a result of 
congressional enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act in 1976 (FLPMA),22 which fundamentally altered public land law 
policy.23 Congress, with the enactment of the FLPMA delegated the 
power to manage and regulate the public lands, not already with-
drawn, to the BLM.24 As such, the term "public lands" has been 
statutorily applied to all land and interests the BLM manages.25 
B. The Constitutional Powers of Congress 
The Property Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the ex-
clusive power to manage and dispose of the lands of the United 
States.26 The clause provides that "Congress shall have Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other property belonging to the United States."27 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Property 
Clause grants Congress plenary powers over the public lands.28 The 
Court has determined that Congress is both owner and sovereign of 
the public lands.29 As owner of the land, Congress can exercise all the 
rights and privileges associated with land ownership.30 As sovereign 
or legislature, Congress has the power to make laws pertaining to 
every aspect of federal land management, including all wildlife living 
on the lands.31 Through a statute, Congress can also delegate its 
power over the public lands to the Executive.32 
States also have the power to regulate public lands within their 
borders.33 The Constitution's Supremacy Clause,34 however, requires 
21 See id. 
2243 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994). 
23 See id. § 1702(e); see also infra Section II(C)(3). 
24 See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e). 
25 Mansfield, supra note 16, at 832. 
26 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See David Getches, Managing the Public Land: The Authority 
of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 282 (1982). Some have argued 
that the executive branch has the power to manage the public property of the United States in 
emergency situations. See Getches, supra, at 293-300. The United States Supreme Court has 
never ruled on this argument, but it seems to be of very little weight. See id. 
27 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
28 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976); Mansfield, supra note 16, at 807. 
29 See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540. 
30 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 806. 
31 See id. at 808"'{)9. 
32 See Getches, supra note 26, at 279-80. 
33 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 809. 
34 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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that state law give way to federal law, if the state law is inconsistent 
with or frustrates the purpose of a federallaw.35 Mining regulations 
are a good example of this.36 Both the state and federal government 
are allowed to regulate mining on federal lands, but state law can 
never prohibit mining on federal lands where it is allowed under 
federallaw.37 
C. From Disposition to Retention 
1. Disposition 
While no comprehensive statutory scheme has governed public land 
law, the policy of disposition dominated and shaped public land law 
from the colonial period up to the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury.3S The fundamental idea behind the policy of disposition was "to 
sell or give away the public lands and resources to private owners and 
states in order that the Nation would be tamed, farmed and devel-
oped."39 
For the first sixty or so years of the Republic, the federal govern-
ment viewed the vast public domain as a tremendous resource it could 
use for the growth and development of the nation, as well as a primary 
source of revenue for the government.40 Thus, under a series of Land 
Acts passed throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Con-
gress auctioned off the public lands at minimum prices ranging from 
two dollars an acre to as low as twelve cents an acre.41 These Acts 
proved fairly successful in disposing of the public lands to private 
individuals, but administration of the Acts proved difficult, and fraud 
and speculation were rampant.42 In the early 1850s, "an unprece-
dented amount of land passed out of the public domain, causing end-
less confusion and antagonism. States, railroads, miners, speculators, 
and settlers all disputed with the federal government and each 
other."43 
35 See id; see also Mansfield, supra note 16, at 813-16, 820. 
36 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 816-17. 
37 See id. at 820. 
38 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 34. 
39 [d. 
40 See id. at 43, 68-69. 
41 See id. at 68-69. 
42 See id. at 69. 
43 COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 69. 
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By the early 1860s, due in part to the problems of fraud and specu-
lation, western settlement had slowed.44 In addition, the "revenues 
from land sales as a percentage of the federal budget had declined 
drastically."45 Given these two facts, Congress felt the best way to 
successfully promote increased settlement was to simply give, free of 
charge, large portions of the public lands to those willing to settle 
them.46 With the Homestead Act of 1862, which granted 160 acres of 
federal land to each western settler for free, Congress did just that, 
and ushered in an era of free land grants that would endure for the 
next 114 years.47 
In addition to simply giving away large portions of western federal 
lands, Congress understood that it was important for growth and 
development of the West to provide settlers with easy access, through 
rail lines, to eastern goods and supplies.48 Therefore, in order to en-
courage and subsidize the construction of rail lines, the federal gov-
ernment, from the 1830s to 1871, granted to railroad companies over 
ninety million acres of federallands.49 It also gave another thirty-five 
to forty million acres to states for use in the subsidization and con-
struction of intrastate rail lines. 50 
Aside from rail subsidies, the federal government granted land to 
each state upon its entrance into the Union.51 The chief beneficiaries 
of these grants were the public schools.52 Any revenue realized from 
the disposition of these lands went to a public school trust.53 Over the 
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the federal govern-
ment set aside seventy-seven million acres of land for the public 
schools of the western states and an additional twenty-one million 
acres for universities.54 
In addition to land grants, the federal government granted rights 
to exploit the natural resources of the public domain.55 Chief among 
44 See id. 
45 [d. at 69-70. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 70. 
48 See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 668 (1979). 
49 COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 88. 
50 See id. 
5! See id. at 45. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. One of Utah's main complaints about the declaration of Escalante was that stopping 
the mining cost the public school trust millions of dollars in lost revenue. See Remarks by the 
President, supra note 3, at 2. 
54 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 45. 
55 See id. at 82. 
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these natural resources were hard rock minerals.56 The Mining Law 
of 187257 was the main statutory provision Congress passed to regu-
late hard rock mineral mining on public lands.58 Amazingly, it remains, 
with little alteration, the main statutory provision that governs hard 
rock mineral mining on the public lands today.59 The Act, which was 
titled an act to "promote the Development of Mining Resources of the 
United States,"60 allowed prospectors free access to any federal lands, 
not otherwise withdrawn from disposal, "for mineral exploration and 
exploitation."61 Once a prospector discovered a valuable deposit of 
minerals, the Act provided him with exclusive right of occupancy to 
the tract ofland.62 In addition, after the prospector had expended over 
$500 on labor or improvements in developing the claim, he could begin 
extracting the minerals from the land.63 The Act also allowed the 
prospector to purchase the land for a fairly modest price.64 
All told, in its quest to develop and expand the nation, the federal 
government, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, disposed of over one billion acres of the public lands to individuals 
and states.65 During the nineteenth century, the federal government 
used the nation's natural resources to spur growth and development 
with little thought towards the long-term conservation of any of those 
same resources.66 While the policy of disposition was instrumental in 
contributing to the tremendous growth of the nation, it subjected the 
public domain to government-sanctioned destruction, waste, and ille-
gal privatization.67 Some have described the era of disposition of fed-
56 See id. at 82-83, 86-87. The government also granted timber rights through various Timber 
Acts. See id. at 118-19. The Acts provided for the purchase of an acre of timber land at anywhere 
between $1.25 and $2.50 an acre as long as the purchaser agreed not use it for speculation. See 
id. Settlers, however, largely ignored these Acts, and continued as had been the case for the 
previous hundred years, to assert dubious claims to title to timber lands, under the "authority" 
of which they plundered and stole the timber of the public domain. See id. In Minnesota, for 
example, sawmill operations were in full force eleven years before a single acre of public land 
was sold in the territory. See id. at 118. 
57 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994). 
58 See id; COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 87. 
59 See 30 U.S.C. § 22; COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 87. 
6oJOHN LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 17 (1987) (quoting 
General Mining Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91). 
61 [d. 
62 See id. at 18. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 72. 
66 See id. at 70. 
67 See id. 
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eral lands from the Civil War on as the "Great Barbecue-a genera-
tion's unparalleled plunder of the Nation's natural resources."68 
2. Retention 
At the close of the nineteenth century the policy of disposition had 
met many of the federal government's goals.69 The frontier had been 
settled and the nation, despite an extremely destructive civil war, had 
grown to be the most powerful and wealthy in all of the Americas.70 
With the close of the frontier came the birth of the conservation 
movement.71 The movement recognized that the resources of the na-
tion were limited and in need of preservation.72 At this time, the 
overarching policy of public land law still remained disposition,73 Con-
gress, however, began to pay heed to the growing conservation move-
ment, and public land law began its slow move toward the policy of 
retention.74 The three Acts discussed below highlight the develop-
ment of this law. 
a. The Antiquities Act of 1906 
The purpose of the Antiquities Act of 190675 was to prevent the 
vandalism and destruction of important archeological ruins that lay 
on public lands.76 To meet this goal section two of the Act provided in 
part that: 
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, 
to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and 
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific 
interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by 
the Government of the United States to be national monuments, 
and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of 
which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible 
with the proper care and management of the objects to be pro-
tected.77 
68 [d. 
69 See Getches, supra note 26, at 283. 
70 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 119. 
71 See id.; Getches, supra note 26, at 283. 
72 See Getches, supra note 26, at 281--85. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994). 
76 RONALD F. LEE, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 190621-28,39 (1970). 
7716 U.S.C. § 431. As discussed above, the Constitution, in the Property Clause, grants 
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Almost immediately after the passage of the Act, President Theo-
dore Roosevelt began to withdraw public lands from disposition under 
it.78 "Although most were of small areas where ruins or some natural 
formation was located, some were of huge areas withdrawn for more 
general preservation purposes."79 Of particular importance was Roo-
sevelt's 1908 withdrawal of the Grand Canyon as "an object of unusual 
scientific interest, being the greatest eroded canyon within the United 
States."8D The legality of the massive size and purpose of the with-
drawal was challenged in Cameron v. United States.8! The United 
States Supreme Court proved unwilling to question the Executive's 
discretion under the Act.82 It upheld the legality of the monument 
designation as suitable under the "scientific interest" clause of section 
two, and made no mention of the size of the monument.83 
Subsequent case law made clear that the courts would exercise 
deference to the Executive under the Act, and required Congress to 
remedy an executive abuse of discretion.84 Such remedies have in-
cluded providing the state in which the withdrawn land is located 
payment for lost tax revenues, and prohibiting the use of the Antiq-
uities Act in that state.85 
b. The Taylor Grazing Act 
In 1934, Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act.86 The Act was 
Congress' response to the destruction, in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
of the western public lands.87 Before it passed the Taylor Grazing Act, 
Congress had allowed free and unlimited access to unleased public 
lands for livestock grazing.88 Since Congress had neither charged for 
plenary power to Congress over the public lands. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see Getches, 
supra note 26, at 279. As such, whenever the Executive withdraws land from the public domain 
it must be done through a delegation of power from Congress. See Richard M. Johannsen, Note, 
Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L. REV. 439, 440-41 (1981). 
78 See Getches, supra note 26, at 302. 
79 [d. 
80 [d. at 303 (quoting Presidential Proclamation No. 2022,47 Stat. 2457 (1932)). 
81 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920). 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 895-96 (D. Wyo. 1945). 
85 See Getches, supra note 26, at 305--D6. 
86 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1994). 
87 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 132. 
88 See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 343 (1918); COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 
12, at 132. 
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the use of the land, nor limited the amount of land upon which a 
rancher could graze his livestock, it made economic sense for a ranch-
er to graze his herds on as much land as possible.89 This resulted in 
massive overgrazing on the public lands.90 In combination with severe 
draught conditions present throughout the Midwest for much of the 
1920s and 1930s, the overgrazing transformed millions of acres of the 
public domain into a vast wasteland on which nothing could groW.91 
Under the authority of the Act, President Franklin Roosevelt, 
through two Executive Orders, temporarily withdrew all public lands 
from disposition, except for mining and mineral leasing.92 The Act 
required the DOl to classify certain of the public lands as grazing 
lands, and to prohibit the activity on the rest.93 With this Act then, 
the federal government, for the first time, mandated wide-scale land 
use planning of the public lands, and by so doing recognized "the 
exhaustion of the values which had made the public domain a dynamic 
force in building the country."94 
3. Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
In 1976, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act (FLPMA),95 which ended the official government policy of 
disposition of the federallands.96 The Act stated in part that it would 
be the policy of the government to retain "the public lands ... in 
Federal ownership, unless as a result of land use planning procedures 
provided for in this Act, it is determined that the disposal of a par-
ticular parcel will serve the national interest."97 
With the FLPMA, the federal government officially recognized that 
it was not the job of the federal government to simply hold the public 
lands until the time was ripe for their disposal.98 Instead it recognized 
that the role of the federal government was to effectively manage and 
preserve the public domain.99 For that reason the FLPMA is consid-
89 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 132. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 Exec. Order No. 6910, Nov. 26,1934; Exec. Order No. 6964, Feb. 5,1935; see Getches, supra 
note 26, at 309-10. 
93 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 134 (quoting E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE 
CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 214-24 (1951)). 
94 Id. 
95 43 U .S.C. § 1701 (1994). 
96 Id. § 1701(a)(1). 
97Id. 
98 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 833. 
99 See id. 
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ered to be the most significant law in the twentieth century, governing 
.the management of the public lands.lOO The Act officially placed all 
public lands not already withdrawn from disposition, under the power 
of the BLM, a division of the DOl, to regulate and manage.101 The 
FLPMA was not clear on exactly how the BLM was to manage the 
public lands to best serve the national interest, but expressed an 
overarching theme of "prudent conservative management."lll2 
The slow change in public land law policy from disposition to reten-
tion is a reflection of the change in the needs of the nation as well as 
society's understanding of the appropriate use of the public lands. lOS 
In the nineteenth century, the public lands were one of the nation's 
chief resources.104 The disposition of these lands to individuals, corpo-
rations, and the states was seen as essential for the growth and 
development of the nation.105 Slowly over the course of twentieth 
century, as much of the public domain had been transferred into 
private hands, the importance of the public lands to the growth of the 
nation dwindled.106 At the same time, a new perspective, one that 
recognized the public lands as a valuable limited resource and em-
braced the values of stewardship and preservation, emerged.107 The 
FLPMA is a culmination of this perspective.108 
III. LAWS GOVERNING COAL MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS 
A. Introduction 
This section explores the history and development of federal law 
regulating coal mining on public lands. It discusses the Mineral Leas-
ing Act of 1920 (MLA),l°9 the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act 
of 1976 (FCLAA),110 and the Surface Coal Mining Reclamation Act of 
100 See id. 
101 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5) (1994); Mansfield, supra note 16, at 833-35. 
102 Getches, supra note 26, at 315. 
103 See id. at 283--84, 309-10; see also COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 119-43. 
104 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 43. 
106 See id. 
106 See Getches, supra note 20, at 283--84, 309-10. 
107 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 43-119; Getches, supra note 26, 283--84, 
309-10; see also Gates, supra note 14, at 725-26. 
108 See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 43-119; Getches, supra note 26, 283--84, 
309-10; see also Gates, supra note 14, at 725-26. 
109 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970) (amended 1976). 
110 Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976). The Act is a series of amendments to the Mineral 
Leasing Act. 
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1977 (SCMRA),lll and the major changes the coal leasing process has 
undergone in the last twenty-five years.U2 
B. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 
The primary purpose of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA) 
was to facilitate, through moderate government regulation, the rea-
sonable development of the coal and oil resources of the nation. us 
Prior to congressional enactment of the MLA, the Coal Acts of 1864 
and 1873 governed all coal mining on the public lands.u4 Under these 
Acts, Congress auctioned off federal coal lands to private parties.u6 
The reason it chose to auction the lands, rather than to subject 
them to disposition, under the Mining Law of 1872 is not clear.U6 One 
possible explanation lies in the fact that in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, coal deposits were much more readily discoverable than mineral 
and precious metal deposits.ll7 Coal lands, therefore, offered a much 
greater potential for raising revenue than mineral and precious metal 
lands. us Conservation, in all likelihood, was not a motivating factor as 
the federal government's perception of the United States in the 1870s 
was that of a nation with a seemingly endless supply of land and 
natural resources.U9 
By the early twentieth century, coal mining had become big busi-
ness.120 The 1864 and 1873 Coal Acts had become hopelessly outdated 
and encouraged fraud and waste on the part of mine operators.121 
These Acts contained limitations on the number of acres an operator 
was able to purchase, which often made it economically unfeasible to 
develop certain coal lands.122 As a result, mine operators frequently 
ignored the limitations and entered onto the coal lands illegally.l23 To 
111 Id. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). 
112 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-220, §§ 1201-1328; Sam Kalen, Where Do We Go From Here?: The 
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act - Past, Present, Future, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 1023, 1026-41 
(1996); 3 Pub. Nat. Resources Law (CBC) §§ 22.02-.03 (1997). 
113 See Gates, supra note 14, at 726--30. 
114 See id. at 724; Kalen, supra note 112, at 1025-26. 
115 See Gates, supra note 14, at 724. 
116 See id. at 724-25. 
117 See id. at 725. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See Gates, supra note 14, at 726. 
121 See id. at 726--30. 
122 See id. at 726. 
123 See id. 
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prevent this theft, in 1906 President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 
withdrew from all forms of entry approximately sixty-six million 
acres of federal coallands.124 In 1910, in response to what it viewed as 
an ever-growing possibility of private ownership of a vast majority of 
the nation's coal and oil lands,125 Congress passed the Picket Act.126 
The Act granted the Executive general withdrawal authority over all 
federal coal and oil lands, and during the next ten years the Executive 
withdrew virtually all of them from disposition.127 
Throughout this period, a heated debate raged in Congress con-
cerning the best way to re-open the withdrawn lands to the public.128 
While some members of Congress advocated giving all the land to the 
states, others wanted to put it up for sale, while still others wanted 
to develop a scheme to lease the land.129 Leasing was the manner in 
which the government could maintain the most control over the land, 
and thus was favored by the conservationists.13o In 1920, the conser-
vationists carried the day and Congress passed the MLA.131 The pas-
sage of the MLA, however, was not so much a victory for the ideals 
of the conservation movement, as it was a recognition, on the part of 
the non-conservationist members of Congress, that leasing was the 
only way Congress could open the public lands to coal development 
anytime in the near future. 132 Under the Picket Act the Executive had 
withdrawn virtually all of the public domain from coal mining and oil 
exploration.133 The nation was not in the throws of an energy crisis, 
and even after the Executive had closed off virtually all the public 
domain from coal and oil development, oil wells operating on private 
lands were producing more oil than the nation needed.134 Thus, seeing 
that the nation had no immediate need for the federal coal and oil 
lands, the conservation-minded members of Congress were willing to 
wait quite some time before reopening the lands to exploration.135 
124 See id. at 726-30. 
125 See Gates, supra note 14, at 732-37; Kalen, supra note 112, at 1026. 
126 30 U.S.C. § 141 (1994). 
127 See Gates, supra note 14, at 736. 
128 See id. at 738. 
129 See id. at 738-41. 
130 See id. at 740-41. 
131 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970) (amended 1976). 
132 See Gates, supra note 14, at 742-43 (citing 58 CONGo REC. 4112 (1919)). 
133 See id. at 740. 
134 See id. (citing JOHN ISE, THE UNITED STATES OIL POLICY 327 (1926)). 
135 See Gates, supra note 14, at 741-43. 
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Under the MLA, the DOl issued two types of coal leases: (1) a 
competitive bidding lease,1s6 and (2) a preference right lease.1s7 The 
DOl issued competitive bidding leases on lands it knew to have work-
able amounts of coal.l33 The process for issuing these types of leases 
was simple. The DOl held an auction and sold the leases to the highest 
bidder.ls9 "Actual competition by bidders in coal lease sales, however, 
was conspicuous by its absence."l40 Indeed, many of the "auctions" 
held under the MLA consisted of just one bidder.141 
Under the preference right leasing system, the potential mine op-
erator applied for a permit to prospect for coal on some portion of the 
federal lands.l42 The DOl had complete discretion on whether or not 
to grant the prospecting permit, but it rarely denied any applica-
tions.l43 The permit entitled the operator to enter the land for a 
specific period of time to perform those activities consistent with and 
attendant to prospecting for coal.144 If the operator discovered coal, 
he could then apply to the DOl for a preference right lease.145 If the 
DOl determined that "commercial quantities" of coal were present on 
the land, a right to the coal vested in the operator, and the DOl issued 
the operator a lease.146 The MLA gave the DOl the power to condition 
the lease on various environmental protections, but it rarely if ever 
did SO.147 
The terms of preference right leases were very favorable to the 
lessees.l43 Under the MLA, the DOl issued preference right leases for 
an indefinite period of time, with a minimum royalty rate of five cents 
per ton.149 The MLA reserved DO I's right to review the status of the 
preference right leases every twenty years, and to readjust the roy-
alty rates, and other terms.l50 Such readjustments, however, were 
136 30 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970) (amended 1976). 
137 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970) (repealed 1976). 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 3 Pub. Nat. Resources Law (CBC) § 22.01[1] at 22--3 (1997). 
141 See COMMISSION ON FAIR MARKET VALUE POLICY FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASING, FED-
ERAL COAL LEASING 152 (1984). The commission reports that 71.8% of all leases issued between 
1920 and 1974 received one bid or no bids. See id. 
142 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
143 See id. 
144 See 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. § 22.01[1] at 22--3. 
146 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 See Berklund, 609 F.2d at 556. 
148 See id. 
149 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1970) (amended 1976). 
160 See id. 
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very infrequent.151 The leases carried no minimum yearly production 
requirements, nor did they place any time requirement on the com-
mencement of mining operations.152 In short, under the preference 
right leasing system the federal government conveyed to operators, 
free of charge, the right to mine large tracts of federal coal lands in 
perpetuity.l53 It is easy to understand why few operators participated 
in the competitive bidding auctions. l54 
As the preference right leases contained no time requirement on 
the commencement of mining, operators often took no steps to de-
velop the coal. l55 Instead, they held the leases for speculation. l56 By 
the early 1970s speculation on the federal coal lands was rampant.157 
One court succinctly summarized the problem: 
From 1945 to 1970, the number of acres of federal land leased for 
coal development increased from about 80,000 to approximately 
778,000, almost a ten-fold increase. In the same period, annual coal 
production from these federal lands declined from about 10 million 
tons in 1945 to approximately 7.4 million tons in 1970. These 
leased areas contain[ed] an estimated 16 billion tons of coal re-
serves .... 158 
In the 1970s when the United States started to feel the effects of 
the energy crisis, Congress expressed a renewed interest in coal as 
an energy source.159 At the time over fifty percent of the nation's 
recoverable coal reserves were on federallands.160 In 1971, in response 
to the wide spread speculation, the DO I announced a temporary 
moratorium on prospecting grants.161 In 1973, it made the moratorium 
permanent while it worked on developing a new leasing process.162 
151 See id. 
162 See Kalen, supra note 112, at 1026. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id at 1028. 
166 See id. 
157 See Kalen, supra note 112, at 1028. 
158 Natural Resource Defense Council v. Hughes, 427 F. Supp. 981, 984 (D.D.C. 1977). The total 
tonnage of coal under lease on the federal lands in 1970 was approximately 250 billion tons. See 
Kalen, supra note 112, at 1029 n.22. 
159 See Kalen, supra note 112, at 1028. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. at 1029. 
162 See id. at 1030. 
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C. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 
In 1976, over the veto of President Ford, Congress enacted the 
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA).163 With the 
FCLAA Congress sought to end speculation on the federal coal lands, 
to realize a fair return for the government on the coal lands, and to 
meet environmental concerns about coal mining.164 In order to fulfill 
these goals, the FCLAA, which governs all coal leasing on federal 
lands after 1976, altered the leasing system of the MLA in many 
significant ways.166 
First, the FCLAA replaced the prospecting permit system with 
the exploration license system.166 The FCLAA granted the DOl the 
power to issue an exploration license to interested parties to explore 
tracts of federal lands for coal deposits.167 Before the DO I could issue 
an exploration license, however, the BLM had to perform "an envi-
ronmental assessment or environmental impact statement, if neces-
sary, of the potential effects of the proposed exploration on the natural 
and socio-economic environment of the affected area."168 BLM regula-
tions required it to deny the exploration license if the agency deter-
mined that exploration "would cause significant and lasting degrada-
tion to the lands .... "l69 
Second, the FCLAA, subject to valid existing rights, that is rights 
that had vested before the passage of the FCLAA, ended preference 
right leasing.170 As such, a right to mine lease did not automatically 
vest, as it did under the MLA, in an operator who had been successful 
in locating "commercial quantities" of coal.17l Instead, the operator 
had to bid, at auction with all other interested parties, for the lease.172 
Third, the FCLAA required the DOl to create a comprehensive 
land use plan which "consider[ed] the effects of the proposed mining 
upon the community and the environment."173 The FCLAA prohibited 
163 Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083; see Kalen, supra note 112, at 1034. 
164 See Kalen, supra note 112, at 1034. 
165 See id. 
166 See 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994); 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.03[2][a] at 22--38 (1997). 
167 See 30 U.S.C. § 201(b); 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.03[2][a] at 22--38. 
168 43 C.F.R § 3410.2-2(a) (1996). 
169 [d. § 3410.2-2(a)(1). 
170 See Pub. L. No. 94--377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (1994». 
171 See 30 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (1994). 
172 See id. 
173 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.03[2][b] at 22-42 (1997). 
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coal leasing on those areas whose land use plan was inconsistent with 
mining.174 
Fourth, the FCLAA changed many of the standard terms of the 
federal coal leases.175 It limited the initial duration of a federal coal 
lease to twenty years, and allowed for renewal as long as the land 
produced "commercial quantities" of coal,l76 In addition, the FCLAA 
subjected every lease to a requirement of diligent development.177 
Specifically, the DOl required the lessee to produce a minimum of one 
percent of the recoverable coal reserves within ten years of the issu-
ance of the lease, or lose the lease.178 The Act also set the minimum 
royalty rate for surface mining at twelve percent, and allowed for a 
lower rate on underground mining operations, which the DOl set at 
eight percent.179 Finally, the Act required review of the terms of the 
lease and possible adjustment of the terms at the end of the initial 
twenty-year period of the lease and every ten years after.18o In a series 
of federal court decisions all the changes described in this paragraph 
were found to apply to pre-FCLAA leases once their initial twenty-
year readjustment period under the MLA had expired.181 
Fifth, and perhaps most significant, the FCLAA changed the defini-
tion of "commercial quantities" of coal,l82 Under the MLA, the 
"[d]etermination of commercial quantities was based solely on 
whether the coal existed, its character and heat-giving quality, and 
whether it could be physically extracted at a profit without regard to 
environmental impact or costS."I83 The FCLAA, on the other hand, 
required the DOl to take into account "the environmental costs of [the 
coal's] ... extraction and subsequent reclamation," when determining 
whether or not a deposit contained "commercial quantities."l84 
BLM regulations implementing the new definition included a mul-
titude of environmental costs that the agency had to consider in 
174 See Pub. L. No. 94..,'377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (1994»; 43 C.F.R. 
§§ 3420.1-4(a), 3425.2. 
175 See 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.03[1] at 22-42 (1997). 
176 See Pub. L. No. 94..,'377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (1994». 
177 See id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3483.l(a)(1), (2) (1996). 
178 See Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(b»; 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-
5(a)(6), (13). 
179 See Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 207(a»; 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(2). 
180 See id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1(a)(1). 
181 See 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.02[4][a] at 22-18 (1997). 
182 See Utah Int'!, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 976, 982 (D.D.C. 1980). 
183 [d. 
184 [d. 
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determining whether or not to allow mining to take place.185 Such costs 
included surface water protection, groundwater protection, air pollu-
tion control, noise abatement, costs of mitigating impacts to wildlife 
species, costs of "monitoring and inspection during mining to identify 
archeological, historical, and other cultural resources ... and costs of 
mitigating impacts to these resources as well as costs of monitoring 
and inspection during mining to identify paleontological, resources ... 
and costs of mitigating impacts to these resources."186 
The DOl has not been very successful in issuing new coal leases 
under the FCLAA.187 For the first six years of the FCLAA's exist-
ence, coal companies, through litigation, prevented any new coal leas-
ing under the Act. l88 In 1981, the DOl granted the first federal coal 
leases under the FCLAA.189 In 1982, controversy erupted over a plan 
by then Secretary of the Interior James Watt to privatize the coal 
lands and allegations that the DOl had charged substantially less than 
fair market value for a large coal lease it had auctioned off in 1981.190 
The ensuing controversy resulted in Watt's resignation, and a con-
gressionally imposed moratorium on coal leasing from 1983 to 1986 to 
allow the DOl to develop better regulations to govern the leasing 
process.191 
In 1986, the DOl promulgated its new regulations and the coal 
companies once again challenged them in court.192 The result was to 
halt coal leasing on federal lands for the rest of the 1980s.193 In the 
early 1990s, the confusion and battling over the legal status of the 
FCLAA settled, and the DOl resumed federal coal leasing.l94 The 
leasing, however, has been on a fairly small scale.195 According to one 
commentator the system "with two prominent exceptions . . . has 
been moribund since 1976, and without drastic change in energy 
markets, prospects for renewed federal coal leasing on any substantial 
185 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3404.4-4(b)(1)-{5), (7), (8) (1996). 
186 Id. (emphasis added). 
187 See Kalen, supra note 112, at 1051~1. 
188 See George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Besides Remains:" The Legal 
Legacy of James C. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 
17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 529 (1990). 
189 See id. 
190 See id. The lease was granted in the Powder River Basin. See id. at 529-30. Estimates put 
the cost of the lease at one hundred million dollars under fair market value. See id. 
191 See Coggins & Nagel, supra note 188, at 530-31; Kalen, supra note 112, at 1051. 
192 See Kalen, supra note 112, at 1051--52. 
193 See id. at 1059. 
194 See id. 
195 See Coggins & Nagel, supra note 188, at 529. 
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scale are dim."I96 Given this current stagnation in the federal leasing 
program, preference right leases "will remain more important in 
terms of [coal] production . . . than leases issued under the 
FCLAA."197 Indeed, the existing leased federal coal lands contain 
enough coal to meet the energy needs of the nation well into the next 
century. 198 
IV. SURFACE MINING COAL RECLAMATION ACT 
The goal of the Surface Mining Coal Reclamation Act of 1977 
(SMCRA)199 was "to establish a nationwide program to protect society 
and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining 
operations."2oo The Act defined surface coal mining operations as those 
"activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a 
surface coal mine or ... surface impacts incident to an underground 
coal mine .... "201 
The SMCRA required operators to restore the land upon which 
they had conducted surface coal operations to "its approximate origi-
nal contours."202 To meet this restoration requirement, the SMCRA 
required the DOl to "promulgate and implement a program for regu-
lating surface mining on the federal lands which incorporate[d] all of 
the general regulatory standards of the Act and consider[ed] any 
unique characteristics of particular federal lands."203 The Office of 
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, (OSM), a division of 
the DOl, has promulgated these regulations.204 They are known as the 
federal lands program regulations.205 Finally, the SMCRA required all 
operators to have a permit, issued from the appropriate regulatory 
authority of the DOl, before commencing any coal mining operations 
on federal lands.206 To receive a permit, operators had to submit a 
reclamation plan that set out in a detailed manner how the operator 
196 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.03[1] at 22-37 (1997). 
197 See id. § 22.02[1] at 22--8. 
198 See id. 
199 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). 
200 ld. § 1202(a). 
2011d. § 1291 (28)(A). Specifically, such activity includes "excavation for the purpose of obtain-
ing coal including ... strip [mining] ... the uses of explosives and blasting ... [and] loading of 
coal for interstate commerce at or near the mine site ... the construction of new roads or the 
improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site .... " ld. 
202 I d. § 1265. 
203 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.04[3][a] at 22-58 (1997). 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. § 22.04[3][b] at 22-59; 30 C.F.R. § 740.13(a)(1) (1996). The permit will issue, depend-
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intended to comply with the federal lands program regulations.207 For 
underground mines the reclamation plan had to show the measures 
the operator planned to implement "to prevent [surface] subsidence 
... and maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable use of surface 
lands."208 
In addition to its restoration requirements, the SMCRA also des-
ignated certain specific types of lands as unsuitable for surface mining 
and subject to valid existing rights, and prohibited the surface coal 
activity on those lands.209 These lands include national parks, national 
wildlife refuges, the National System of Trails, the National Wilder-
ness Preservation System, national forests, publicly owned parks or 
any other place listed in the National Register of Historic Places, land 
within three hundred feet of an occupied dwelling, and land within 
one hundred feet of a cemetery.210 In addition, the SMCRA set out 
general unsuitability criteria, which, subject to valid existing rights, 
would prohibit surface coal activity on land that met any of those 
criteria.211 The BLM has promUlgated regulations implementing these 
criteria.212 
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF TAKINGS LAW AND ANDALEX'S LEASE 
RIGHTS IN ESCALANTE 
A. Introduction 
All land is encumbered with a combination of public and private 
rights.213 The function of property law is to strike a balance between 
these two competing types of rights.214 Property law, indeed all law, 
however, changes with time to meet the changing needs of society.215 
ing on the type of mining and on the type of federal land, from the BLM, the OSM, or the Forest 
Service. See id. § 22.01[3] at 22--u to 22--8. 
207 See 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a) (1994). 
208 [d. § 1266(a)-(b). 
209 See id. § 1272(e)(1). 
210 See id. 
211 See id. § 1272(a). 
212 See 43 C.F.R § 3461.1(b) (1996). 
213 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017, 1027 (1992); Robert J. 
Goldstein, Greenwood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into 
Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 362--u3, 409 (1998); Mansfield, supra note 
14, at 194. 
214 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017, 1027; Goldstein, supra note 213, at 362--u3, 409; Mansfield, 
supra note 14, at 194. 
215 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 10-11 (1927). 
1998] BALANCING RIGHTS IN THE NATION'S LANDS 763 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in his book The Paradoxes of Legal Sci-
ence, made this point quite eloquently: 
If a body of law were in existence adequate for the civilization of 
today, it could not meet the demands of the civilization of tomor-
row. Society is inconstant. So long as it is inconstant, and to the 
extent of such inconstancy, there can be no constancy in law .... 
Law defines a relation not always between fixed points, but often, 
indeed oftenest, between points of varying position. The acts and 
situations to be regulated have a motion of their own. There is 
change whether we will it or not.216 
As property law evolves, rights within in it change, and the balance 
it strikes between public and private rights necessarily changes as 
well.217 One commentator has put it as follows: "[t]here may be a 
constitutional core to the term property but no rights are frozen. 
Protection of both property rights and other rights align with societal 
needs and understanding through a process of evolutionary . . . 
change."218 An understanding of this point is crucial to this Comment's 
criticism of current takings law. 
B. Lucas and the Supreme Court's Takings Law 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
in part that the federal government shall not take private property 
for public use without just compensation.219 In Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, the United States Supreme Court analyzed this 
prohibition with respect to government regulation.220 In 1986, Lucas 
"paid $975,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, . . . a 
barrier island situated eastward of the city of Charleston," South 
Carolina, upon which he intended to construct homes.221 In 1988, the 
South Carolina legislature enacted the Beach Front Management 
Act.222 The Act set out specific areas along the coast upon which 
"construction of occupable improvements was flatly prohibited."223 
Lucas' land was in one of these areas.224 
2161d. 
217 See id. at 67-80; Mansfield, supra note 14 at 213. 
218 See id. at 67-80; Mansfield, supra note 14, at 213. 
219 U.S. CON ST. amend. V. 
220 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-10, 1014-19 (1992). 
221 ld. at 1006, 1008. 
222 See id. at 1007. 
2231d. at 1008--D9. 
224 See id. 
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Lucas brought suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, 
claiming that the Act's prohibition against construction on his land 
"effected a taking of his property without just compensation under 
the Fifth Amendment."225 The trial court found that the Act "de-
priv[ed] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots" and 
thereby "render[ed] 'them valueless," and as such found that the Act 
constituted a taking of Lucas' property.226 The Supreme Court of 
South Carolina reversed the trial court's decision.227 The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari, and found for Lucas.228 
In the majority opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court found that any 
regulation that deprived land of virtually all economically beneficial 
use was a compensable taking. The Court, however, allowed for an 
exception where the legislature had identified a background principle 
of nuisance or state property law in enacting the legislation.229 
The Court based its holding on the theory of "investment backed 
expectations," which posits that the law should honor land owners' 
reasonable economic expectations with respect to the use of their 
land.230 The government can regulate land use, but if a regulation 
deprives a land owner of all reasonable economic use of his or her 
property, the government has effectively taken the land, and must 
compensate the owner.231 Under this theory, however, where the gov-
ernment has identified a background principle of nuisance or state 
property law in enacting a regulation, no taking occurs because such 
a regulation is nothing more than a codification of the common law.232 
Therefore, if the common law prohibits the use, the owner at the time 
of purchase, could not reasonably have expected to use the property 
in that manner, as it was illegal.233 The regulation simply prohibits a 
use of the land that "[was] not part of [the landowner's] title to begin 
with," so it "takes" nothing from the land owner.234 
There should be some concern with the Court's emphasis on "in-
vestment backed expectations," as it tends to make land into an 
225 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09. 
226Id. 
227 See id. 
228 Id. at 1010. 
229 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8, 1027 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978»; Mansfield, supra note 14, at 214. 
230 See id. at 1019 n.8. 
231 See id. at 1017, 1027. 
232 See id. at 1027. 
233 See id. 
234 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. The Court termed this "the logically antecedent inquiry into the 
nature of the owner's estate." 
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"inert, fungible thing" created solely for the profit of its owner.235 As 
the Court stated in Lucas, "for what is the land but the profits 
thereofl"236 But land of course is more than just "the profits thereof." 
It has a certain non-quantifiable, non-market based, intrinsic value 
"that transcends the ownership of an individual."237 Anyone who has 
ever walked through a forest, or rested in a lush field of grass, or stood 
on the peak of a mountain surveying the world below, understands 
this. 
The emphasis on the economic nature of property inherent in the 
"investment backed expectations" creates a danger that future courts 
will place undue importance on the rights of land owners.23B If courts 
start seeing land as nothing more than a commodity, there is a poten-
tial for violation of the public's common law rights in the land.239 The 
public has these common law rights to protect and preserve the land's 
natural, intrinsic value.240 If land is just a commodity, this natural, 
intrinsic value is lost.241 Another potential problem with the Supreme 
Court's takings law as enunciated in Lucas, is its failure to address 
the fact that the needs of individuals and society change over time, 
and as such the law, and the "background principles" that inform the 
law change over time as well.242 Lucas could be read to freeze the 
rights of the property owner to the background principles guiding the 
law at the time of purchase, and to base all reasonable expectations 
of the property owner on those principles.243 Lucas fails to expressly 
acknowledge that rights in property have traditionally not been fixed, 
and that property owners, in forming reasonable "investment backed 
235 See id. at 1017, 1027; Goldstein, supra note 213, at 384-85. 
236 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812». 
237 Goldstein, supra note 213, at 404. 
238 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8, 1027 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); Mansfield, supra note 14, at 214. Indeed, in making its decision, the Court 
did not discuss any legal standard for the determination of when land has been deprived of 
virtually all economic value. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020. Instead, it accepted the trial court's 
finding that this in fact was the case with Lucas' property. See id. at 1045 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). In his dissent Justice Blackmun pointed out that in making this determination the 
trial "court accepted no evidence from the State on the property's value without a home, and 
the petitioner's appraiser testified that he never had considered what the value would be absent 
a residence." [d. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun thought this finding was clearly 
erroneous and felt that the trial court "appeared to believe that the property could be considered 
'valueless' if it was not available for its most profitable use." [d. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
239 Goldstein, supra note 213, at 384-85, 412. 
240 See id. at 59-60. 
241 See id. 
242 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; CARDOZO, supra note 215, at 10-11. 
243 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; Mansfield, supra note 14, at 213, 221-25. 
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expectations," must have an expectation that the law will change and 
along with it their rights under the law.244 
As this Comment has shown, public land law, and the background 
principles that guide it, have changed over time to conform with 
societal values and the needs of the nation.246 In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the rights of the individual in the federal lands dominated over 
the rights of the public.246 This fit well with the needs of the growing 
nation.247 The most efficient way for the federal government to pro-
mote the growth, settlement, and development of the nation, was to 
get the vast public lands and their natural resources in the hands of 
private individuals.248 As such, the federal government, with little or 
no restriction on its use, simply gave away much of the nation's land.249 
As a result, throughout the course of the nineteenth century, much of 
the nation's public land experienced significant economic develop-
ment, but also suffered mass plundering.250 
As the nation grew, its needs changed, and as the twentieth century 
progressed, the policy of disposition slowly gave way to the policy of 
retention.261 During this time, Congress shifted its focus to society's 
non-economic interests in the public lands, and the balance of the 
public and private considerations in the federal lands slowly changed 
to reflect this shift in focus.262 In the twentieth century, the people of 
the nation began to see the federal lands as a valuable limited re-
source, whose best and most efficient use for the nation was not 
unfettered disposal to private parties.263 They began to recognize that 
the common good of the nation was best served through the retention 
and preservation of this valuable limited resource.254 This recognition 
was part of a bigger change, taking place in both the United States 
and the world, of society's understanding of the environment and 
humanity's effect upon it.266 
244 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; Mansfield, supra note 14, at 221-25. 
246 See supra notes 38-67 and accompanying text. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 44-S4 and accompanying text. 
260 See supra notes 38~7 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 68-106 and accompanying text. 
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
264 See id. 
266 See id.; Getches, supra note 26, at 283--84; Goldstein, supra note 213, at 390--95; Mansfield, 
supra note 14, at 195-201. 
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Within the last twenty-five years this change has been so profound 
as to effectively create a new environmental paradigm for the gov-
ernance of public policy and the law.256 Within this paradigm, "humans 
... [have begun] to understand the workings of the earth, and to take 
seriously their responsibility [of] preserving the health of the 
planet."257 In the realm of public land law, the new paradigm has 
brought about substantial changes in society's understanding of the 
rights and responsibility of property ownership.258 Society's attitude 
has changed from allowing a landowner discretion over how to use his 
or her land to recognizing a landowner's obligation of stewardship 
arising out of the public interest.259 
C. Analysis of Andalex's Lease Rights 
The land upon which Andalex's leases rest and all the land in the 
monument is "some of the most remarkable ... in the world."260 The 
area is comprised of striking red rock soil on "high-elevation plateaus 
of the region that have been eroded into breathtaking, brilliantly 
colored canyons, arches, buttes and river valleys that defy descrip-
tion."261 In addition to its aesthetic beauty, Escalante also contains a 
vast array of 
geological, paleontological, archaeological, biological and historical 
features ... [t]housand-year old pinon and junipers can be found 
in the region, as well as prehistoric dwellings, examples of ancient 
rock art, a world-class fossil trove, millions of years of geological 
history, and hundreds of living species of amphibians, birds, mam-
mals and reptiles.262 
256 See Goldstein, supra note 213, at 395. 
257 [d. 
258 See id. at 390--95. 
259 [d. 
260 Remarks by the President, supra note 3, at 3. 
261 Jahn, supra note 7, at Al. The Presidential Proclamation reads in part, 
[t]he monument is a geological treasure trove of clearly exposed stratigraphy and 
structures. The sedimentary rock layers are relatively undeformed and unobscured by 
vegetation, offering a clear view to understanding the process of the earth's forma-
tion .... The monument contains a significant portion of a vast geological stairway, 
named the Grand Staircase by pioneering geologist Clarence Dotton, which rises 5,500 
feet to the rim of Bryce Canyon in an unbroken sequence of great cliffs and plateaus. 
Presidential Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,225 (1996). 
262 Bureau of Land Management Homepage, Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monu-
ment: Images and Information (Feb. 1998) <http://www.blm.gov> [hereinafter BLM Home-
page]. 
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From the above description of the monument area, it seems clear 
that under current public land laws, the BLM could not legally issue 
the leases today.263 The monument area is full of a vast array of 
priceless, archeological and paleontogical artifacts, which by their 
very nature once destroyed Andalex could not replace.264 Given this 
it would seem that any coal deposit in Escalante, no matter how much 
coal it contained, would fail the FCLAA's "commercial quantities" test 
which, requires the DOl to take into account the environmental costs 
of removing the coal. 265 
BLM regulations include in environmental costs, those costs asso-
ciated with preventing destruction of "archeological, historical, and 
other cultural resources, [and] paleontogical resources."266 As the ar-
tifacts are spread all throughout the monument area, no practical or 
efficient way exists to protect them from the damage the construction 
and use of hundreds of miles of paved roads, and the mining itself 
would cause.267 In addition, no way exists to properly restore the area 
to its pre-mining condition, as the SMCRA requires.268 The fact that 
the President had to declare the area a national monument, to prevent 
the mining from happening, makes that point quite clear.269 
Beyond the specific statutory prohibitions of the public land law, 
the BLM would not issue the leases today, simply because coal mining 
in an area such as Escalante is so completely out of sync with today's 
environmental paradigm so as to rise to the level of the absurd.270 
Today's environmental paradigm recognizes that "[fJederal coal leas-
ing [and mining] does not occur in ... isolation.''271 Today we under-
stand the potential harmful effects of mining on certain lands and we 
take steps to avoid such effects, even if this means not mining. Before 
the BLM issues a lease today, it carefully studies the nature of the 
land, and assesses whether or not mining on the land would conform 
with society's understanding, as expressed through its environmental 
263 See supra notes 180-84,200-10 and accompanying text. 
264 See BLM Homepage supra note 262. 
265 See supra notes 180--84 and accompanying text. 
266 43 C.F.R. §§ 3404.4-4(b)(1)-{5), (7), (8) (1996). 
267 See Press Briefing by Secretary of Interior, supra note 7; BLM Homepage, supra note 262. 
268 See supra notes 200-10 and accompanying text. 
269 See BLM Homepage, supra note 262. The large size of the monument is necessary because 
many of the objects and features it seeks to protect are scattered bit by bit throughout its 1.7 
million acres. See id. Fragmentation of the protected areas would thus make protection of the 
all objects and features very difficult if not impossible. See id. 
270 See Goldstein, supra note 213, at 390--95. 
271 3 Pub. Nat. Resources L. (CBC) § 22.03[1] at 22-37 (1997). 
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legislation, of where and when mining is appropriate.272 Today the 
BLM would not issue a lease on the lands of Escalante, because to 
allow the destructive forces of mining on its rare and delicate lands is 
simply not in accord with society's and the law's understanding of 
where and when mining is appropriate.273 
The BLM first issued Andalex's leases on the Kaiparowits Plateau 
in 1965 under the MLA.274 In 1965, the original owner had the right 
to mine the coal in the Kaiparowits Plateau.275 Andalex acquired the 
leases through assignment in 1986, and the right to mine transferred 
to it.276 To keep Andalex from mining in Escalante, Lucas requires 
that the government compensate the company.277 Lucas focuses the 
Court's takings analysis on the economic expectations of the property 
owner at the time of acquisition.278 This is an important focus.279 With-
out an ability to rely on the stability of existing property rights, 
buyers would be far less likely to purchase property and to invest in 
its improvement. In a capitalist society, a rule of law which ignored 
the reasonable economic expectations of a buyer, would result in a 
drastic reduction in commercial transactions and investments, with a 
subsequent decline in the economic welfare of a nation and its people. 
Lucas, however, does not look only at the private economic inter-
ests of the property owner.280 The reasonable "investment backed 
expectations" of the property owner includes a realization that his or 
her property is subject to background principles of nuisance law.281 
Nuisance is a broad and flexible concept in the common law.282 Nui-
sance law is not a set of fixed and rigid rules frozen in eighteenth 
century ideals,283 and "[c]orrectly viewed and applied, [the Lucas] 
nuisance exception can justify significant regulation of private ... 
interests in public land law."284 As the Supreme Court said in Mugler 
272 See supra notes 180--84,200-10 and accompanying text. 
273 See Goldstein, supra note 213, at 390-95; Remarks by the President, supra note 3, at 3. 
274 See BLM Serial Register Pages, supra note 6. 
275 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
276 See id. at 557-58; BLM Serial Register Pages, supra note 6. 
277 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8, 1027 (1992); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
278 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8, 1027. 
279 See id. at 1027. 
280 See id. 
281 See id. 
282 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887); Mansfield, supra note 14, at 222-25. 
283 See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665; Mansfield, supra note 14, at 222-25. 
284 Mansfield, supra note 14, at 225. 
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v. Kansas, "all property in this country is held under the implied 
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the 
community."285 The application of the concept of nuisance can be seen 
in the development of zoning law in this country.286 While there was 
once virtually no statutory restrictions on the use a property owner 
could make of his or her property, zoning laws have exacted very 
substantial restrictions on property use since the early part of the 
twentieth century.287 Courts have upheld these restrictions so long as 
they did not deny the owner of all reasonable economic use of his or 
her property.288 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Andalex's case, as was the case in Lucas, government regulation 
denied Andalex of all reasonable use of its property. The Presidential 
Proclamation establishing Escalante deprived the company of the 
only property right it had in the lease-the right to mine coal in the 
Monument. The President and the DOl were therefore obligated to 
provide compensation, and this they did by provision of a lease swap. 
At the same time, the President, by his Proclamation, acknowledged 
the rights of the rest of society to the preservation and protection of 
an irreplaceable national treasure, and correctly repudiated the Lucas 
proposition "for what is land but the profits thereon" 
285 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665. 
286 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926). 
287 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-28 (1978); Euclid, 272 U.S. 
at 379-84, 387-89, 395-97. 
288 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125-28, 133-37; Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395-97. 
